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Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called
emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately
programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often
treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such
as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue
that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from
one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and
nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by
a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for
conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not di-
rectly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide noncon-
scious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the
cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building
the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is
known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.
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Much progress has been made in conceptualizing con-sciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the
question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and
has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive
processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in
real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand,
have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed
experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.
Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to con-
scious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from
those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we
propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lower-
order information by cortically based general networks of cog-
nition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for
feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs
that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive
assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits
(the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is de-
fined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional
higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higher-
order states are essential for emotional experiences.
Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain
Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing
about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of
“fear.”We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing
emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define “fear”
as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our
conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain
that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least
be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.
The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said
to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1–6). These “basic
emotions” are typically proposed to be wired into the brain’s
limbic system (7). Although the limbic system theory has been
criticized extensively (6, 8–12), it still guides much research and
theory in neuroscience. Fear, for example, is often said to be
dependent upon a set of circuits that have as their hub the limbic
area called the amygdala (5, 8, 13–19).
A great deal of research has shown that damage to the
amygdala disrupts the ability of animals and people to respond to
threats behaviorally and physiologically (13–15, 17, 19, 20).
Furthermore, functional imaging studies in humans show that
the amygdala is activated in the presence of threats (21–30). This
work is often interpreted to mean that threats induce a state of
fear by activating a fear circuit centered on the amygdala, and
this same circuit controls the behavioral and physiological re-
sponses elicited by the threat; these responses are often called
fear responses (5, 6, 8, 13, 17, 31) (Fig. 1A).
What is meant by “fear” varies among those who use it to account
for behavioral and physiological responses to threats. For some, fear
is a subjective state, a phenomenal experience elicited by danger.
Darwin (1), for example, called emotions like fear states of mind
inherited from animals. Mowrer (32) argued that rats freeze “by
cause” of fear. Panksepp (5) noted that “fear is an aversive state of
mind,” the major driving force of which is a “subcortical FEAR
system” (33). Others, like Perusini and Fanselow (31), agree that
danger elicits fear and fear causes behavior, but they do not treat it
as a subjective experience; for them, fear is a brain state that in-
tervenes between threats and defensive behaviors. It is, in fact,
common in behavioral neuroscience to construe animal and human
behavior as being caused by so-called central states rather than by
subjective experiences, while at the same time retaining the sub-
jective state term (13, 16–18, 34). This approach allows animal re-
search to be relevant to the human experience of fear, but leads to
much confusion about what researchers mean when they use the
term “fear” (20, 35).
Although we agree with those who argue that it is inappropriate
to call upon subjective experiences to explain animal behavior, we
maintain that subjective experience is a seminal part of human
existence and is indispensable in the effort to understand human
nature. A way is needed to conceive of behavioral responses to
threats in animals and humans with similar constructs, but without
attributing unmeasurable subjective states to animals, and without
denying the role of subjective experience in humans. The notion of
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evolutionarily conserved defensive survival circuits that account for
the behavioral and physiological responses to threats, but that are
not directly responsible for subjective experiences of fear, accom-
plishes this goal (20, 24, 35–37).
The Defensive Survival Circuit View. Defensive survival circuits are
evolutionarily wired to detect and respond to innate threats and
to respond to novel threats that have been learned about in the
past (35, 36). As viewed here, defensive survival circuits indi-
rectly contribute to the feeling of fear, but their activity does not
constitute fear. The amygdala-centered circuit described above is
an example of such a defensive survival circuit. Fig. 1B illustrates
the defensive survival circuit view, relative to the fear circuit
view, of amygdala contributions to threat processing.
That the defensive survival circuit is separate from the circuit
that gives rise to the conscious experience of fear is suggested by
several lines of evidence. First, it is well established that con-
scious feelings of fear and anxiety are poorly correlated with
behavioral and physiological responses, such as those controlled
by defensive survival circuits (38). If the same circuit was in-
volved the correlation should be strong. Second, studies using
subliminal stimulus presentation methods (e.g., backward masking
or continuous flash suppression) to prevent or reduce awareness of
visual stimuli show that visual threats activate the amygdala and
elicit body responses despite the fact that participants deny seeing
the stimulus (21–30). Under such conditions, participants do not
report feeling fear, even when explicitly instructed to be intro-
spective about what they are experiencing (39). Third, “blindsight”
patients, who lack the ability to consciously see visual stimuli in a
particular area of visual space, exhibit amygdala activation and
physiological responses to visual threats presented in that part of
space despite denying seeing the stimulus and without reporting
fear (40–42) (see SI Appendix, Box 2 for a discussion of blindsight
and other neurological patients that have contributed to con-
sciousness research). Fourth, although damage to the amygdala
interferes with bodily responses to threats, it does not interfere with
conscious experience of emotions such as fear (43, 44). These
findings all suggest that the amygdala-defensive survival circuits
processes threats nonconsciously (8, 9, 20). This does not mean that
defensive survival circuits play no role in conscious fear: they
modulate the experience of fear, but are not directly responsible for
the conscious experience itself.
How, then, does the conscious experiences of fear come about,
if not as the product of an innate subcortical circuit? We argue
below that fear results from the cognitive interpretation that you
are in a dangerous situation, one in which physical or psychological
harm may come to you. As such, an emotional experience like fear
comes about much the same as any other conscious experience: as a
result of processing by the GNC. However, these circuits process
different inputs in emotional vs. nonemotional conscious experi-
ences, and in different kinds of emotional experiences.
Consciousness in Contemporary Philosophy, Cognitive
Science, and Neuroscience
In recent years empirical findings in cognitive science and neu-
roscience have helped reshape views of what consciousness is
and how it comes about. In discussing this research we will em-
phasize consciousness as a subjective experience, as opposed to
the condition of an organism simply being awake and responsive
to sensory stimulation (45, 46).
Measuring Conscious Experiences. Essential to researching con-
sciousness as subjective experience is some means of measuring
internal states that cannot be observed by the scientist. The most
common method is the use of verbal self-report (20, 47, 48). This
allows researchers to distinguish conditions under which one is
able to state when they experience a sensory event from when
they do not. Verbal self-report depends on introspection, the
ability to examine the content of one’s mental states (49, 50).
Introspection, in turn, is believed to involve such cognitive pro-
cesses as attention, working memory, and metacognition (51–
53), processes that are called upon in cognitive theories of
consciousness (47, 54–57).
Nonverbal behavior is satisfactory for demonstrating that a
human or other animal is conscious in the sense of being awake
and responsive to stimuli, and for demonstrating cognitive capacities
underlying working memory, attention, metacognition, problem-
solving ability, and other indicators of intelligent behavior (52).
However, because not all cognitive processing leads to conscious
experience (52, 58–62), cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal
behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious
awareness (for further discussion of the measurement of con-
sciousness through verbal and nonverbeal means, see SI Appendix,
Box 3, and for discussion of nonconscious cognition, especially
nonconscious working memory, see SI Appendix, Box 4).
Neural Correlates of Reportable Conscious Experiences. Evidence
has mounted in recent years implicating specific brain circuits in
introspectively reportable conscious experiences of visual stimuli
in humans. For example, when self-reports of the stimulus are
compromised by using subliminal stimulation procedures, such
as masking (63), areas of the visual cortex (including primary and
secondary areas) are functionally active, but when participants
are able to consciously report seeing a visual stimulus, additional
cortical areas become active (47, 54, 64–71). Most consistently im-
plicated are various areas of the lateral and medial prefrontal cor-
tex, but activations are also reported in the parietal cortex and
insular cortex (Fig. 2). These cortical areas are, not surprisingly,
components of the GNC (72–75). Related findings come from
blindsight patients (76) who, because of damage to the visual cortex,
are unable to report on the presence of visual stimuli in the part of
visual space processed by the damaged area of the cortex, despite
being able to respond nonverbally to the stimulus. When the stim-
ulus is in the part of space they can see and report on, cortical areas
of the GNC are activated, but when it is in the blind area these
areas are not activated (65, 77). Although the imaging studies in
healthy people and blindsight patients suggest correlates of con-
sciousness, other studies show that disruption of activity in GNC
areas, especially in the prefrontal or parietal cortex, impairs con-
scious awareness of visual stimuli (78–80).
Phenomenal Consciousness. A key idea that pervades discussions
of consciousness is phenomenal experience. In the most general
sense, so-called phenomenal consciousness is just the property of
there being something that it is like for one, from one’s point of
view, to be in a particular state (81). When I consciously experience
pain, or see red, there is something that it is like, and that something
can only be known through experience. The specific phenomenal
properties of an experience, sometimes called “qualia,” are said to
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Fig. 1. Two views of amygdala contributions to threat processing. In the
fear circuit view (A) the amygdala is responsible for both the subjective
experience of fear and the control of so-called “fear responses.” In the de-
fensive survival circuit view (B) the amygdala controls defensive responses
but is not responsible for subjective experiences elicited by threats.
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be the specific aspects or contents of the conscious stream of ex-
perience (82). Explaining consciousness in the phenomenal sense is
the (in)famous “hard problem” of consciousness (83). To address
the hard problem is to provide an account of how it is that phe-
nomenal consciousness emerges from brain activity: to explain why
all of the information processing in the brain is not going on “in the
dark,” in the so-called cognitive unconscious (58).
First-Order vs. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.A key issue is
whether introspection captures the nature of our phenomenally
conscious experiences. Ned Block (84) has argued that intro-
spection only reveals those aspects of consciousness to which we
have cognitive access, what he calls “access consciousness.”
Phenomenal consciousness, according to Block, is a more funda-
mental level of experience that exists separately from and inde-
pendent of cognitive access. The difference between phenomenal
and access consciousness can be illustrated by considering first-
order vs. higher-order theories of consciousness.
First-order theorists, such as Block, argue that processing re-
lated to a stimulus is all that is needed for there to be phenomenal
consciousness of that stimulus (85–89). Conscious states, on these
kinds of views, are states that make us aware of the external envi-
ronment. Additional processes, such as attention, working memory,
and metacognition, simply allow cognitive access to and intro-
spection about the first-order state. In the case of visual stimuli, the
first-order representation underlying phenomenal consciousness is
usually said to involve the visual cortex, especially the secondary
rather than primary visual cortex. (Fig. 3A). Cortical circuits, es-
pecially involving the prefrontal and parietal cortex, simply make
possible cognitive (introspective) access to the phenomenal expe-
rience occurring in the visual cortex.
In contrast, David Rosenthal and other higher-order theorists
argue that a first-order state resulting from stimulus-processing
alone is not enough to make possible the conscious experience of
a stimulus (90–93). In addition to having a representation of the
external stimulus one also must be aware of this stimulus re-
presentation. This is made possible by a HOR, which makes the
first-order state conscious (Fig. 3B). In other words, conscious-
ness exists by virtue of the relation between the first- and higher-
order states. Cognitive processes, such as attention, working
memory, and metacognition are key to the conscious experience
of the first-order state. In neural terms, the areas of the GNC,
such as the prefrontal and parietal cortex, make conscious the
sensory information represented in the secondary visual cortex.
Varieties of HOT are described in SI Appendix, Box 7.
HOT has the advantage of appealing to a set of well-established
cognitive operations underlying introspective access. In contrast,
first-order theory is plagued by its appeal to a noncognitive kind of
access that leads to experiences that can go undetected to the
“conscious” person, and that are difficult to verify or falsify sci-
entifically (20, 94–96). With this view, you can have phenomenal
conscious experiences that you do not access (that you do not
“know” exist) (88). Because it is truly hard to imagine what it
might be like to have a conscious experience of a stimulus of which
you are not aware, this key feature of first-order theory is
contested (98–100) (debate on this topic is discussed further in SI
Appendix, Box 5). Additionally, first-order theory is challenged by
empirical findings (91, 101) and computer modeling (102). Block
agrees that there must be some kind of introspective access
(what he has called “awareness-access”) when there is phe-
nomenal consciousness (88, 89), but he also insists that this kind
of access is not cognitive; what exactly noncognitive introspec-
tion might be is unclear (for further discussion of this point, see
SI Appendix, Box 6).
Most cognitive theories call upon similar cognitive processes
in accounting for conscious experience, but do so in somewhat
different ways. Included are theories that emphasize attention
and working memory (47, 55, 57, 59, 103–109), processing by a
global workspace (56, 110, 111), or the interpretation of expe-
rience (112). A common thread that runs through various cog-
nitive theories is that processing beyond the sensory cortex is
required for conscious experience. In this sense, these other
cognitive theories, although not explicitly recognized as HOTs,
have a close affinity to the basic premise of HOT (for more on
the relation between HOTs and other cognitive theories, see SI
Appendix, Box 7).
Although the debate continues over first-order theory and
HOT, our conclusion is that introspectively accessed states,
which we view as phenomenally conscious experiences, are best
described in terms of HORs that depend on the GNC, cortical
circuits involving regions of the lateral and medial prefrontal
cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and insular cortex (Fig. 2).
These GNC have been implicated in attention, working memory,
and metacognition (72–75), which—as discussed—are viewed as
essential to consciousness in most cognitive theories. We are not
suggesting that the brain areas included in the GNC are locations
where consciousness literally occurs in a homuncular sense.
Consciousness involves complex interactions between circuits in
the GNC and sensory cortex, as well as other areas (especially
those involved in memory). Furthermore, we do not mean to





Fig. 2. GNC that contribute to conscious experiences. Functional imaging
studies have implicated circuits spread across frontal and parietal areas in
conscious experiences in humans. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; OFCL, lat-
eral orbital frontal cortex; OFCM, medial orbital frontal cortex; PFCDL, dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex; PFCDM, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; PFCVL,
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; PFCVM, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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Fig. 3. First-order vs. higher-order theories of consciousness. Consciousness
depends solely on sensory representations of stimuli in first-order theory (A)
but depend on the representation of the lower-order information by circuits
that underlie cognitive functions, such as working memory in HOT (B).














experiences; different subcircuits may well contribute to different
aspects of consciousness (91, 113).
Emotions in Light of the First- vs. Higher-Order Debate
Panksepp’s (5, 114) emotion theory described above can be
reconceived as a first-order emotion theory. In his view, core
phenomenal states of emotional consciousness, such as feelings
of fear, are innate experiences that arise in humans and other
mammals from evolutionarily conserved subcortical circuits.
These states are described as “implicit procedural (perhaps truly
unconscious), sensory-perceptual and affective states” (115, 116).
Although they “lack reflective awareness,” they nevertheless “give
us a specific feeling.” Then, through cognitive processing by cortical
circuits (presumably the GNC), the states can be accessed and in-
trospectively experienced. There is a striking similarity between
Panksepp’s theory and Block’s distinction between phenomenal and
access consciousness. Like Block, Panksepp calls upon conscious
states that the organism is unaware of but cannot introspect or talk
about (they “give us a certain feeling” but “lack reflective aware-
ness” and “are perhaps truly unconscious”).
Similar to Panksepp, Antonio Damasio builds on the idea that
subcortical circuits (what he calls “emotional action” systems)
control innate behaviors and related physiological responses.
Unlike Panksepp, though, Damasio assumes that these subcortical
action systems operate nonconsciously. For him, basic/core phe-
nomenal feelings result when feedback from the body responses is
represented in “body sensing” areas of the brain to create emotion-
specific “body states” or “somatic markers” (6, 117). Initially,
Damasio emphasized the importance of body sensing areas of the
cortex in giving rise to feelings, but more recently he has revised his
view, arguing that core feelings are products of subcortical circuits
that receive primary sensory signals from the body (118). The
subcortical sensory representations are genuine first-order sensory
states that, in the theory, account for phenomenal experiences of
basic emotions. Then, through cognitive processing in cortical areas,
including the insular, somatosensory, and various prefrontal re-
gions, introspectively accessible experiences emerge. Findings from
patients with autonomic failure and alexithymia (119), although
superficially supportive, primarily show quantitative changes in
subjective experience, more consistent with a modulatory role of
body feedback.
The subcortical representations proposed by Pankesepp and
Damasio clearly occur in humans and other mammals. However,
the evidence that these actually give rise to phenomenally ex-
perienced feelings that exist independent of introspective access
is, to us, not convincing (20). Given that the arguments both
theorists make about animal consciousness rest on the similarity
of the circuitry in animals and humans, the weakness of the ev-
idence about these subcortical circuits supporting phenomenal
consciousness in humans, and the inability to directly measure
consciousness in animals, questions the value of the animal states
as a way of understanding the brain mechanisms of human
emotional consciousness.
In our opinion, the subcortical circuits proposed by Panksepp
and Damasio are better interpreted as contributing nonconscious
first-order representations that indirectly influence the higher-
order assembly of conscious feelings by the GNC. We develop a
HOT of emotion below.
A Modified Higher-Order Theory
Traditional HOT needs to be modified before using it as the
foundation for a theory of emotional consciousness. Specifically
needed are changes to its treatment of introspection, of higher-
order states that lack an external source, and of the self.
Introspection and the Higher-Order Account of Phenomenal Experience.
As noted above, in general, first-order and higher-order theories
seek to explain the same thing: the phenomenology of experi-
ence, the essence of what it is like to have an experience.
However, Rosenthal, the leading higher-order theorist, does
not accept Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access
consciousness; for him there is just consciousness. The reason
Rosenthal avoids phenomenal consciousness hinges on his
construal of it as tacitly committing one to a first-order view (SI
Appendix, Box 8).
According to HOT, one is not typically conscious of the
higher-order state itself, but instead is conscious of the first-order
state by virtue of the HOR of it. To be aware of the higher-order
state (to be conscious that you are in that state) requires yet an-
other HOR. Higher-order theorists typically reserve the term
“introspection” for this additional level of representations (90).
This amounts to the claim that introspection consists in a con-
scious higher-order state (i.e., a third-order state, or a HOR of the
initial HOR). For example, Rosenthal uses introspection to refer
to situations when one is attentively and deliberately focused on
one’s conscious experiences. He argues that this additional state
(the HOR of the HOR) is considerably less common than simply
noticing one’s experiences, and thus that introspection is not a key
part of normal, everyday consciousness (90).
We propose a more inclusive view of introspection, in which
the term indicates the process by which phenomenally experi-
enced states result. Following Armstrong (120), we argue that
introspection can involve either passive noticing (as, for example,
in the case of consciously seeing a ripe strawberry on the coun-
ter) or active scrutinizing (as in the case of deliberate focused
attention to our conscious experience of the ripe strawberry).
Both kinds of introspection, in our view, lead to phenomenal
experience. Thus, as we use the term “introspection,” the HOR
that is responsible for consciousness on the traditional HOT
would count as passive introspectively noticing one’s first-order
states, and the second HOR would count as introspectively
scrutinizing the first HOR. This notion of a HOR of a HOR is a
part of our modified HOT, described next.
Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory. A key criti-
cism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation be-
tween the higher-order state and the state which it represents
(121). That is, the first-order state is said to be transformed into
a phenomenally conscious state by virtue of it being represented
by the higher-order state (92, 122, 123). This is depicted in
Fig. 3B by the arrow between the higher-order and lower-order
state; in other words, the higher-order state makes conscious the
lower-order state. This idea roughly preserves the perception-
like nature of higher-order awareness. However, it is possible to
have the experience as of seeing something without it being there
to be seen, as in the case of hallucinations or in dreams. In a
somewhat similar way it might be possible to have higher-order
awareness in the absence of a first-order representation. In fact,
there seems to be empirical confirmation of this (see discussion
of Charles Bonnet Syndrome below and in SI Appendix, Box 9).
To account for this limitation a version that does not depend on
a relation between the higher-order state and a sensory repre-
sentation has been proposed (96, 124). This revised HOT in-
volves a HOR of a representation, and is thus called HOROR.
HOROR theory argues that phenomenal consciousness does
not reflect a sensory state (as proposed by first-order theory) or
the relation between a sensory state and a higher-order cognitive
state of working memory (as proposed by traditional HOT) (96,
100, 124). Instead, HOROR posits that phenomenal conscious-
ness consists of having the appropriate HOR of lower-order
information, where lower-order does not necessarily mean sensory,
but instead refers to a prior higher-order state that is rerepresented
(Fig. 4A). This second HOR is thought-like and, in virtue of this,
instantiates the phenomenal, introspectively accessed experience of
the external sensory stimulus. That is, to have a phenomenal
experience is to be introspectively aware of a nonconscious
HOR. This introspective awareness, in ordinary circumstances,
will be the passive noticing discussed earlier. This passive kind of
noticing, which we postulate is responsible for the existence of
phenomenal consciousness, differs from the active scrutinizing
of one’s conscious experience that requires deliberate attentive
focus on one’s phenomenal consciousness. Active introspection
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requires an additional layer of HOR (and thus a HOR of
a HOROR).
HOROR theory is supported by empirical cases where phe-
nomenal consciousness plausibly outstrips first-order represen-
tations. One example, as mentioned, occurs in Charles Bonnet
Syndrome, and another involves empirical findings of inattentional
inflation in healthy humans (91, 96). In these cases, what it is like for
the subjects is better tracked by the higher-order states. Specifically,
these cases suggest that there is more that is phenomenally expe-
rienced than can be accounted for in terms of first-order repre-
sentations. For example, in the extreme case of the rare form of
Charles Bonnet Syndrome subjects have severe damage to their
visual cortex (and thus presumably lack first-order representations,
or at least have sparse first-order representations) and yet have rich
and vivid visual experiences in hallucinations.
If HOROR is correct, the nonconscious events that contribute
to consciousness are not sensory cortex events but instead are
HORs of sensory events (the first HOR). HOROR thus depends
on the existence of nonconscious HORs. Our hypothesis is that
the nonconscious HOR, and the HOROR that instantiates the
awareness of ourselves as being in the HOR, both occur within
working memory. Although some have questioned the capacity
of nonconscious working memory, and thus its ability to support
consciousness (88, 125, 126), the plausibility of our hypothesis is
supported by results from recent studies indicating that non-
conscious processing within working memory is more robust than
previously observed (79, 101, 108, 127) (for additional discussion
of nonconscious working memory, see SI Appendix, Box 4).
Given that the conscious experience of a stimulus presumably
depends on object memories, which are stored in the medial
temporal lobe memory systems (128–130), the lower-order re-
presentations that underlie consciousness could involve memory
rather than—or in addition to—sensory representations. That is,
so-called explicit memories, until retrieved into working mem-
ory, are in a nonconscious state (20). The relation of memory to
consciousness deserves more attention than it currently receives.
Refining the Role of the Self in HOT. In traditional HOT (90, 122,
131, 132), the content of the HOR is talked about as “I thoughts”
(133) and is postulated to have something like the content “I am
in state x.” For example, if one were consciously seeing red then
the higher-order state would have the content “I am seeing red.”
It is important to note that in this view the self is implied to be
represented by the reference to “I” in the propositional statement.
However, this representation is not of the conscious self (113) and
can be construed as being implicit or nonconscious (134). The
higher-order state thus represents the first-order state as belonging
to oneself, but in an extremely thin sense that does not invoke the
conscious self or self-consciousness. Thus, a distinction between
self and other that includes body sensations or mental states, but
that does not explicitly represent the conscious self, is not a state of
self-awareness. Because of this, and to avoid confusion, we phrase
the thesis above as simply “being aware of the state” rather than
“I am aware of myself as being in the state.”
When a higher-order state includes information about oneself,
it becomes possible for there being something that it is like for
“you” to be in that state. This is what we call “self-HOROR,” a
HOROR that includes information about the self. Tulving refers
to experiences that include the self as “autonoetic conscious-
ness,” and experiences that do not as “noetic consciousness”
(135–137). The presence of the self in the nonconscious repre-
sentation allows for an autonoetic conscious (a self-HOROR)
state to result from the re-representation (Fig. 4B).
Tulving proposed that noetic and autonoetic consciousness are
associated with two classes of explicit or conscious memory,
called semantic and episodic memory (135–137). Semantic memo-
ries consist of factual knowledge and are experienced as noetic
states of consciousness; episodic memories are about facts anchored
in space and time that involve the self, and are experienced as
autonoetic states of consciousness (138). The involvement of the
self makes episodic memories personal, that is, autobiographical.
With autonoetic consciousness, one can engage in mental time
travel to remember the past and imagine the future self.
Other animals have factual elements of episodic memory (the
ability to form memories about what, where, and when some
event occurred) (139, 140). Whether they can engage in self-
referential conscious thinking (141), and thus have self-awareness,
is less certain (20, 142, 143). Self-awareness is viewed by many as a
uniquely human experience (112, 135, 136, 144–147).
Klein (148) draws an important distinction between episodic
memory (memory of what happened, where it happened, and
when it happened) and autonoetic consciousness (the awareness
that the facts about what, where, and when happened to you). If
so, episodic memory can be thought of as simply a complex form
of semantic memory rather than as memory about the self. Only
when the self is explicitly integrated into the episode does
autonoetic awareness occur. In this sense, animals may have
episodic (what, where, when) memory, and maybe even noetic
awareness, but may nevertheless lack autonoetic awareness.
Self-HOROR depends on self-knowledge, which includes both
explicit (consciously accessible) and implicit (not consciously
accessible) memory (9). Our focus here is on information about
the self that has the potential for conscious access, or at least for
influencing conscious experience, and thus that falls in the do-
main of explicit memory. Explicit memory is acquired and re-
trieved via the medial temporal lobe memory system (128–130).
Such memories are in effect nonconscious until they are re-
trieved into working memory and rendered conscious (20).
We view the self as a set of autobiographical memories about
who you are and what has happened to you in your life, and how
you think, act, and feel in particular situations (149, 150). Such
bodies of information are called schema (151–153). As part of
self-HOROR theory, we thus propose that autobiographical self-
schema (154, 155) contribute to conscious states in which the self
is involved.
The cognitive functions (working memory, attention, meta-
cognition, and so forth) and neural circuits (especially prefrontal
circuits) that underlie HORs are also required for conscious
experiences involving the self, including emotional states in-
volving the self (145, 156–162). These functions integrate non-
conscious factual (what) and episodic context (where and when)
information with nonconscious representations of autobiographical
B
A
Fig. 4. HOROR theory. (A) HOROR is a variant on HOT (see Fig. 3 for HOT).
In it, the first HOR is nonconscious and must be rerepresented by another
higher-order state. This creates a noetic (factual) state of consciousness. (B)
However, if the self is part of the nonconscious representation then the
HOROR results in an autonoetic (self-aware) state of consciousness.














information into a nonconscious HOR that is rerepresented as an
autonoetic HOROR (a self-HOROR) that supports a conscious
experience of the event as happening to you.
We propose that these various representations involve inter-
actions between the medial temporal lobe memory system and
areas of the GNC in creating the nonconscious representations
that are the basis of the self-HOROR within the GNC. Earlier
we noted that circuits within the GNC should not be thought of
as making unified contributions to consciousness, and indeed
evidence exists for a distinction within prefrontal cortex circuits
for self-referential (autonoetic) conscious experiences as op-
posed to experiences of external stimuli (91, 113).
Self-representations have been described as integrated hubs
for information processing, a kind of “associative glue” (156).
This notion becomes especially important in emotional states
that, we argue, crucially depend on representation of the self as
part of the higher-order state that constitutes the felt experience.
A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness
The modifications of HOT just described allow us to view the
phenomenal states we call emotions as HORs. Particularly im-
portant to our HOT of emotional consciousness (HOTEC) is the
notion that emotions depend on the self. Without the self there
is no fear or love or joy. If some event is not affecting you, then it
is not producing an emotion. When your friend or child suffers
you feel it because they are part of you. When the suffering of
people you don’t know affects you emotionally, it is because you
empathize with them (put yourself in their place, feel their pain):
no you, no emotion. The self is, as noted above, the glue that ties
such multidimensional integrated representations together (156).
First-order theories of emotion require two circuits of con-
sciousness: a subcortical circuit for first-order phenomenal con-
scious feeling (one that is not available to introspection and yet is
supposedly consciously experienced) and a cortical circuit for
higher-order, introspectively experienced conscious feelings. In
HOTEC only one circuit of consciousness is required: the GNC.
That GNC circuits contribute to conscious emotions, and to
representations of the self in emotions, is indicated by studies
showing activation of prefrontal areas (163) and differences in
prefrontal morphology (164) in relation to fearful or other
emotional experiences, as well as studies showing activation of
prefrontal areas in self-judgments about emotions (161) and
deficits in self-consciousness in emotions in people with damage
to fronto-temporal areas (162).
An important prediction of our theory is that damage to first-
order subcortical circuits, such as a defensive survival circuit or
body-sensing circuits, should mute but not eliminate feelings of fear.
Evidence consistent with exists (43, 44). Relevant research questions
and predictions are summarized in SI Appendix, Box 10.
If the circuits that give rise to cognitive states of awareness
(the GNC) also give rise to emotional self-awareness, how can
we distinguish emotional from nonemotional cognitive states of
awareness? One of us (J.E.L.) has long argued that emotional
states of consciousness depend on the same fundamental neural
mechanisms as any other state of consciousness, but that the
inputs processed are different (8, 9, 20, 165, 166). Below, we
incorporate this notion into a HOT of emotion, using the feeling
of fear resulting from an encounter with a visual threat as
an example.
A visual threat, say a snake at your feet, is processed in two
sets of circuits in parallel in the process of giving rise to a feeling
of fear. Cortical circuits involving the visual cortex, memory
systems of the medial temporal lobe, and the cognitive systems
related to the GNC are engaged in the process of representing
the stimulus and ultimately experiencing it (Fig. 5A). At the same
time, subcortical defensive survival circuits centered on the
amygdala control innate behavioral and physiological responses
that help the organism adapt to the situation (Fig. 5B). Both sets
of circuits are far more complex that the simplified versions
shown for illustrative purposes.
Stimulus-processing streams beginning in the retina and con-
tinuing through the various stages of the visual cortex create a
representation of the snake. Then, through connections from the
visual cortex to the medial temporal lobe and GNC this repre-
sentation is integrated with long-term semantic memories, allowing
the factual information about snakes and their potential for causing
harm to be rerepresented nonconsciously in working memory (a
HOR). This nonconscious information is then the basis for a further
rerepresentation (a HOROR) that allows a noetic conscious
experience of the facts of the situation, an awareness that a
potentially dangerous situation is unfolding. Retrieval of self-
schema into the representation allows the representation to
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Fig. 5. HOTEC extends HOT and HORROR theory to
account for the self. In HOTEC, the difference be-
tween an emotional and nonemotional state of
consciousness is accounted for by the kinds of inputs
processed by the GNC. Red lines show circuit inter-
actions that are especially important in emotional
states. Red text indicates states/events that occur during
emotional but not nonemotional experiences. See
main text for additional details. Emo-HOR, emotional
higher-order representation; MTL, medial temporal
lobe; WM, working memory.
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However, although self-HOROR is necessary it is not suffi-
cient for an emotional experience. Self-HOROR can be purely
cognitive (your personal knowledge that there is a pencil present
and that it is you that is looking at this pencil) or emotional
(there is a snake present and you are afraid it may harm you).
What accounts for this difference? This takes us to the second
set of circuits that contributes to fear: defensive survival circuits.
Activation of defensive circuits during an emotional experi-
ence results in various consequences that provide additional
kinds of inputs to working memory, thus altering processing in
the in the GNC in ways that do not occur in nonemotional sit-
uations (20) (Fig. 5B). For one thing, outputs of the amygdala
activate arousal systems that release neuromodulators that affect
information processing widely in the brain, including in the
GNC. Amygdala outputs also trigger behavioral and physiolog-
ical responses in the body that help cope with the dangerous
situation; feedback to the brain from the amygdala-triggered
body responses (as in Damasio) also change processing in many
relevant circuits, including the GNC, arousal circuits, and sur-
vival circuits, creating loops that sustain the reaction. In addition,
the amygdala has direct connections with the sensory cortex,
allowing bottom-up attentional control over sensory processing
and memory retrieval, and also has direct connections with the
GNC. These various effects on the GNC may well influence top-
down attentional control over sensory processing, memory re-
trieval, and other cognitive functions. The GNC is also important
in regulation over time of the overall brain and body state that
results from survival circuit activation (21, 167, 168).
Unlike in traditional HOT, where there is somewhat of a hi-
erarchical, or serial, relation between lower- and higher-order
cortical circuits, in HOTEC the amygdala represents an addi-
tional lower-order circuit that can be activated in parallel with,
and even independent of, the GNC. For example, subcortical
inputs from visual or auditory areas of the thalamus can activate
the amygdala before and independent of the GNC (8, 20). This
finding suggests that direct amygdala activation, say by deep
brain stimulation, might produce subjective experiences related
to fear. Some claim that findings from such stimulations show
that fear experiences are directly encoded in the amygdala (5).
However, the subjective consequences of brain stimulation are
not necessarily encoded by the neurons stimulated (20, 169).
Moreover, the vague nature of the verbal reports in these studies
(170) are less consistent with induction of specific emotional
experiences than with the possibility that activation of body or
brain arousal by amygdala outputs could, along the lines pro-
posed by Schachter (171), induce a distressing state of disso-
nance that is cognitively interpreted and labeled as fear or
anxiety (20). This information, together with the observation that
amygdala damage (see above) does not eliminate fear experi-
ences, suggest that fear can exist independent of the lower-order
inputs. Whether such experiences are different, either quantita-
tively or qualitatively, because of the absence of the conse-
quences of amygdala activation, is not known.
One additional factor needs to be considered. An emotion
schema is a collection of information about a particular emotion
(20, 172–174). A fear schema, for example, would include factual
information (semantic memories) about harmful objects and
situations, and about behavioral and body responses that occur
in such situations. Thus, if you find yourself in a situation in
which a harmful stimulus is present (a threat), and notice, through
self-monitoring, that you are freezing and your heart is racing, these
factors will likely match facts associated with fear in the fear schema
and, through pattern completion, activate the fear schema. The
schema will also include factual memories about how to cope with
danger, and episodic memories about how you cope with such sit-
uations, which will bias the particular thoughts and actions used to
cope. Emotion schema are learned in childhood and used to cate-
gorize situations as one goes through life. As one becomes more
emotionally experienced, the states become more differentiated:
fright comes to be distinguished from startle, panic, dread, and
anxiety. When an emotion schema is present as part of a HOR, it
biases the content of the experience that the HOR will support.
Thus, an autonoetic emotional experience of fear is based on an
emotional HOROR that includes the self (a fear self-HOROR). Of
particular note is that the presence of a vague threat or physio-
logical arousal, as noted above in relation to brain stimulation, may
be sufficient to induce pattern completion of the fear schema.
Tulving argued that autonoetic consciousness is an exclusive
feature of the human brain (135). Other animals could, in
principle, experience noetic states about being in danger. How-
ever, because such states lack the involvement of the self, as a
result of the absence of autonoetic awareness, the states would
not, in our view, be emotions.
Another unique feature of the human brain that is relevant to
self-awareness is natural language. Language organizes experi-
ences into categories and shapes thought (175, 176). Words re-
lated to various emotions are an important part of the emotion
schema stored in memory. More than three-dozen words exist in
English to characterize fear-related experiences (177). It has
long been thought that language influences experience (178),
including emotional experience (179, 180). Language also allows
symbolic representation of the experience of emotions without
the actual exposure to the stimuli that normally elicit these
emotions (181). Damasio’s (6, 117) notion of “as-if loops” and
Rolls’s “if-then syntactic thoughts” (169) are consistent with this
idea. Although the ability to imagine emotions is useful, this can
also become a vehicle for excessive rumination, worry, and obses-
sions. If self-awareness and emotion can exist without language,
these are surely different when the organism has language.
We have emphasized here how defensive circuits can con-
tribute to conscious emotional feelings of fear. This makes it easy
to slip into the idea that a defensive survival circuit is a fear
circuit. However, the feeling of fear can occur in response to
activity in other survival circuits as well (e.g., energy, fluid bal-
ance, thermoregulatory circuits); in relevant circumstances, you
can fear dying of starvation, dehydration, or freezing to death.
We call these fears (or “anxieties”) because they are triggered by
specific stimuli and interpreted in terms of stored schemas re-
lated to danger and harm to well-being. An emotional experi-
ence results from the cognitive representation of situations in
which you find yourself, in light of what you know about such
situations from past experiences that have provided you with
factual knowledge and personal memories.
One implication of our view is that emotions can never be
unconscious. Responses controlled by subcortical survival cir-
cuits that operate nonconsciously sometimes occur in conjunc-
tion with emotional feelings but are not emotions. An emotion is
the conscious experience that occurs when you are aware that
you are in particular kind of situation that you have come, through
your experiences, to think of as a fearful situation. If you are not
aware that you are afraid, you are not afraid; if you are not afraid,
you aren’t feeling fear. Another implication is that you can never be
mistaken about what emotion you are feeling. The emotion is the
experience you are having: if you are feeling afraid but someone
tells you that they think you were angry or jealous, they may be
accurate about why feeling angry or jealous might have been ap-
propriate, given behaviors you expressed in the situation, but they
would be wrong about what you actually experienced.
An important question to consider is the function of fear and
other states of emotional awareness. Our proposal that emotions
are cognitive states is consistent with the idea that once they are
assembled in the GNC they can contribute to decision making (6,
117, 169), as well as to imaginations about one’s future self and the
emotions it may experience, and about decisions and actions one’s
future self might take when these emotions occur. This notion
overlaps with a proposal by Mobbs and colleagues (24, 164).
Emotion schema, built up by past emotions, would provide a con-
text and set of constraints for such anticipated emotions. In the
short-term, anticipated emotions might, like the GNC itself, play a
role in top-down modulation of perceptual and memory processing,
but also processing in subcortical survival circuits that contribute to
the initial assembly of the emotional state. Considerable evidence














shows that top-down cognitive modulation of survival circuits occurs
(21, 167, 168), and presumably emotional schema within the GNC,
could similarly modulate survival circuit activity.
Relation of HOTEC to Other Theories of Emotion
A key aspect of our HOTEC is the HOR of the self; simply put,
no self, no emotion. HOROR, and especially self-HOROR,
make possible a HOT of emotion in which self-awareness is a key
part of the experience. In the case of fear, the awareness that it is
you that is in danger is key to the experience of fear. You may
also fear that harm will come to others in such a situation but, as
argued above, such an experience is only an emotional experi-
ence because of your direct or empathic relation to these people.
One advantage of our theory is that the conscious experience
of all emotions (basic and secondary) (2–5), and emotional and
nonemotional states of consciousness, are all accounted for by
one system (the GNC). As such, elements of cognitive theories of
consciousness by necessity contribute to HOTEC. Included im-
plicitly or explicitly are cognitive processes that are key to other
theories of consciousness, such as working memory (54, 55, 57,
103, 104, 182), attention amplification (105, 109), and reentrant
processing (87).
Our theory of emotion, which has been in the making since the
1970s (8, 9, 20, 35, 166, 183), shares some elements with other
cognitive theories of emotion, such as those that emphasize
processes that give rise to syntactic thoughts (169), or that ap-
praise (184–186), interpret (112), attribute (171, 187), and con-
struct (188–192) emotional experiences. Because these cognitive
theories of emotion depend on the rerepresentation of lower-
order information, they are higher-order in nature.
Conclusion
In this paper we have aimed to redirect attention from subcortical
to cortical circuits in the effort to understand emotional con-
sciousness. In doing so, we built upon contemporary theorizing
about perceptual consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science,
and neuroscience, and especially on the debate between first- and
higher-order theories, in an effort to account for how feelings arise
as a result of introspective awareness of internal information.
Using the emotion of fear to illustrate our views, we argue that
in the presence of a threat different circuits underlie the con-
scious feelings of fear and the behavioral responses and physi-
ological responses that also occur. The experience of fear, the
conscious emotional feeling we propose, results when a first-
order representation of the threat enters into a HOR, along with
relevant long-term memories—including emotion schema—that
are retrieved. This initial HOR involving the threat and the
relevant memories occurs nonconsciously. Then, a HOROR al-
lows for the conscious noetic experience of the stimulus as
dangerous. However, to have the emotional autonoetic experi-
ence of fear, the self must be included in the HOROR. In typical
instances of fear, these representations are supplemented by the
consequences of activation of subcortical survival circuits (not
just defensive circuits but any circuit that indicates a threat to
well-being). However, as noted earlier, fear can occur when the
defensive survival circuit is damaged. Furthermore, existential
fear/anxiety about the meaningless of life or the eventuality of
death may not engage survival circuits at all. Our theory can thus
potentially account for all forms of fear: those accompanied by
brain arousal and bodily responses and those that are purely
cognitive and even existential. Although we have focused on fear,
we believe that the basic principles involved can be leveraged to
understand other emotions as well.
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